The EU and the UK, having navigated a protracted and often complex path, have now reached the final phase of adopting and concluding the EU–UK Competition Cooperation Agreement (the Agreement).
On 20 May 2025, the European Commission adopted a proposal to conclude the Agreement. It reflects the mutual recognition of the indispensable need for close cooperation in the field of competition law.
This article provides an overview of the negotiation process and highlights the significance of the framework now nearing completion.
Following Brexit, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) between the EU and the UK entered into force on 1 May 2021. It aimed to provide a solid foundation to maintain a longstanding partnership and foster good neighbourly relations.
The TCA established a framework for cooperation across several key areas, including competition policy and enforcement. In line with this objective, Article 361 of the TCA underscores the importance of cooperation between national competition authorities (NCAs) in both developing and enforcing competition policy. It enables NCAs and the European Commission to cooperate and coordinate with the UK’s competition authorities, and to exchange information – including confidential information – to the extent permitted under their respective national laws.
To implement these objectives, Article 361(4) provides that the parties can conclude a dedicated cooperation and coordination agreement, which may also encompass exchanging and using confidential information.
As part of Article 361(4) of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the Council authorised the Commission on 8 June 2023 to initiate negotiations with the UK on a dedicated agreement on cooperation and exchanging information in the field of competition law. These negotiations were concluded at expert level in October 2024.
The resulting Agreement supplements the TCA, and accordingly, the governance structure and territorial scope established under the TCA will also apply, as confirmed in the Explanatory Memorandum. This sequence of developments ended on 20 May 2025, when the European Commission announced the adoption of proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the Agreement – an outcome likely influenced, at least in part, by the EU–UK Summit held the preceding day.
The Agreement will enter into force once ratified by both parties, subject “on the EU side” to approval by both the Council and the European Parliament.
Scope and purpose: Laying the foundations for operational cooperation
As is apparent from the TCA and official communications from European representatives (notably Vice-President Ribera), the purpose of the Agreement is to promote cooperation and coordination in competition matters between the respective competition authorities, with the aim of enhancing the effective enforcement of each party’s competition laws. The personal scope of the Agreement extends to the EU competition authorities – including the European Commission and the member states’ national competition authorities – and to the competition authorities of the UK and Northern Ireland.
Substantive focus and enforcement coordination
The Agreement aims to establish a framework for cooperation and coordination exclusively in the areas of antitrust and merger control. So it expressly excludes state aid and broader regulatory matters from its scope.
Its primary focus lies in facilitating the exchange of information between the parties. Pursuant to Articles 3 and 4, the parties have to notify each other of enforcement activities that could significantly affect the interests of the other party. This notification should occur after the public disclosure of an investigative step in the relevant proceeding.
The Agreement also creates a legal basis for coordinating enforcement activities. Where competition authorities are engaged in, or foresee, parallel or related enforcement proceedings, they can agree to coordinate their actions where coordination is deemed mutually beneficial. This coordination can extend to matters involving the voluntary disclosure of information by undertakings or individuals.
However, any participating authority retains the right to unilaterally withdraw from coordination at any time and to continue enforcement independently, without prejudice to the broader objectives of the Agreement.
The Agreement further seeks to mitigate jurisdictional conflicts through a negative comity provision, requiring competition authorities to give due consideration to each other’s important interests throughout their enforcement activities. Where potential adverse effects might arise, the authorities are expected to make all reasonable efforts to reach a mutually acceptable resolution, within the constraints of their respective domestic legal frameworks.
Article 6 of the Agreement permits the parties to share information, including confidential information, to the extent permitted under their respective domestic laws. Exchanges are subject to national rules on confidentiality and data protection and may require the prior written consent of the information provider – unless domestic law explicitly allows disclosure without consent.
Information shared under the Agreement can only be sent to the designated competition authorities, and cannot be further disclosed to other domestic bodies or third countries without the express prior authorisation of the original transmitting authority.
The Agreement also establishes a flexible communication framework between competition authorities, allowing the use of simple means, such as email, except where the authorities involved agree that more secure methods are necessary. Requests for formal review under Article 11 must be submitted in writing through diplomatic channels, underscoring their procedural weight. Provisions are also included concerning the confidentiality and permissible use of information exchanged under the Agreement.
Comparative outlook: Moving beyond traditional bilateral frameworks
In assessing whether the EU–UK Competition Cooperation Agreement constitutes a closer and more effective model of cross-border enforcement cooperation, it’s instructive to compare it to earlier international arrangements – most notably the EU–Switzerland cooperation agreement.
The comparison shows that the EU–UK framework provides a markedly more operational and flexible model of cooperation. Both agreements seek to enhance competition law enforcement through coordination and information exchange. But the EU–UK Agreement allows for a broader range of collaborative enforcement activities and permits the sharing of confidential and personal data without the provider’s consent, provided disclosure is authorised under the applicable national law.
By contrast, the EU–Switzerland Agreement adopts a more cautious, consent-based approach to information exchange, placing strict limitations on the use of data – especially where it concerns information obtained through leniency or settlement procedures.
The agreement and the ECN framework: A departure from deep integration
Building on the comparison with the EU–Switzerland competition cooperation agreement, it’s equally instructive to assess how the EU–UK Agreement compares to the internal enforcement and cooperation framework of the European Competition Network (ECN).
While the EU–UK Agreement aspires to preserve a high level of coordination in the post-Brexit landscape – particularly in enforcement and information sharing – it’s markedly less integrated than the ECN model.
The ECN, established by Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 and further reinforced by Directive (EU) 2019/1, constitutes a deeply integrated institutional framework in which the European Commission and national competition authorities operate under binding and structured obligations. These include the mandatory exchange of case-related information, mutual assistance in investigations and enforcement, and the allocation of cases based on efficiency and jurisdictional suitability.
Notably, confidential information can be exchanged without the undertaking’s consent, provided it’s used exclusively for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. This high level of coordination, mutual trust, and recognition underpins a quasi-federal enforcement model in the internal market.
By contrast, the EU–UK Agreement reflects a more restrained third-country framework. It allows for the exchange of confidential information, but the exchange is governed by the applicable domestic law and, as a general rule, requires the consent of the information provider – unless explicitly authorised otherwise.
The Agreement doesn’t impose binding obligations on competition authorities to cooperate in enforcement matters; rather, cooperation is voluntary. Authorities can agree to coordinate their enforcement activities where mutually beneficial, but each retains the unilateral right to withdraw from coordination at any time and pursue enforcement independently, without prejudice to the remainder of the Agreement.
So, while the EU–UK Agreement goes beyond the more limited and rigid cooperation model found in the EU–Switzerland Agreement, it falls short of the deeper structural and procedural integration that characterises the ECN.
This contrast underscores the UK’s changed status: no longer embedded in the EU’s internal competition governance framework but rather positioned as a closely aligned third country – within the constraints imposed by political and legal realities.
The EU–UK Competition Cooperation Agreement offers a pragmatic yet forward-looking framework to sustain effective cooperation in the post-Brexit era. While it falls short of the ECN’s institutional depth, it surpasses earlier international models by allowing structured coordination and the lawful exchange of confidential information.
Once ratified, the Agreement will provide a solid basis for continued cooperation in competition law enforcement and coordination between the EU and the UK.
Author: Máté Mondok
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